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Case Notes
The California Supreme Court, Pettit
and Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Teachers
The law pertaining to disciplinary sanctions against professionals
for allegedly immoral conduct has been going through a period
of redefinition and flux. Pettit v. State Board of Education' rep-
resents a departure from the clear trend of recent cases. In this
case the issue was whether or not the plaintiff, Mrs. Pettit, had
engaged in conduct which evidenced her unfitness to teach.2 A
close analysis of the facts reveals that the California Supreme
Court's holding deviates from previous decisions by ignoring oper-
ant factual distinctions and controlling precedent, most notably
that which was developed in the leading case of Morrison v. State
Board of Education.8
1. 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973).
2. CAL. ED. COnE ANN. § 13202 (West Supp. 1974), amending CAL.
ED. CODE ANN. § 13202 (West 1969).
"[T]he ... Commission for Teacher Preparation and Licensing
shall revoke or suspend for immoral or unprofessional conduct, or
for persistent defiance of, and refusal to obey, the laws regulating
the duties of persons serving the public school system, or for any
cause which would have warranted the denial of an application
for a ... credential or the renewal thereof, or for evident unfit-
ness for service.
3. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
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Mrs. Pettit and her husband were representative of a segment
of our society which enjoys diverse sexual activity. In 1966, both
she and her husband appeared on a local television talk show, in
cognito.4 They expressed their "liberated," modern views of mar-
riage and extramarital sexual activity. Approximately one year
later, the Pettits applied for membership in a "swingers club."
They were accepted, and, thereafter, attended a party by the "club"
at a member's private home. Unbeknownst to the partygoers, their
activities were being closely scrutinized by Sergeant Berk, an un-
dercover agent present at the party. After observing plaintiff en-
gaged in oral copulation with three different men while her hus-
band and others looked on, the sergeant arrested her and charged
her for violation of California Penal Code Section 288(a). 5 The
original charge was subsequently dropped and plaintiff pleaded
guilty to California Penal Code Section 650.5, a misdemeanor.6 Mrs.
Pettit was fined and put on probation. Upon paying the fine, the
probation was terminated; all other criminal proceedings were dis-
missed.
Mrs. Pettit had held a lifetime teaching credential since 1957.
During this time she had been employed in an elementary school
teaching retarded children. The standard teacher evaluations
which are prepared yearly by the supervising principal demon-
strated that her performance had been completely satisfactory. In
1968, she was tendered a contract for re-hire to cover the 1968-69
school year, but, in 1970, the State Board of Education brought
a proceeding against Mrs. Pettit seeking the revocation of her cre-
dential. Hearings were held with Sergeant Berk testifying as well
,as two superintendents and an assistant superintendent. The thrust
of the superintendents' testimony was that plaintiff was unfit to
teach moral and sexual values. 7 Dr. William Hartman s testifying
4. Joe Pyne Show.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 288 (a) (West 1970).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 650.5 (West 1970), (outraging public de-
cency). This section generally refers to lewd behavior in public. Viola-
tion constitutes a misdemeanor. It was held to be unconstitutionally vague
in In re Davis, 242 Cal. App. 2d 645, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966).
7. Petit, 10 Cal. 3d at 316 and n.1, 513 P.2d at 890, 109 Cal. Rptr.
at 666.
8. Professor of sociology, California State University at Long Beach,
licensed clinical psychologist and director of the Center for Marital and
Sexual Studies.
on plaintiff's behalf, stated that Mrs. Pettit was a well-adjusted,
normal individual and that the conduct in question was unlikely
to be repeated. The hearing examiner concluded as follows: (1)
that although her performance as a teacher had always been sat-
isfactory, and (2) she was unlikely to repeat the conduct in ques-
tion, (3) her actions were highly unconventional, immoral, and (4)
evidenced her unfitness to teach. Mrs. Pettit's credential was re-
'yoked.
Mrs. Pettit then sought a writ of mandate to review and set
aside the examiner's order. The Superior Court denied the writ
and upheld the order. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia, the writ was again denied in a 5-2 decision authored by Justice
Burke, with Justices Tobriner and Mosk dissenting.
THE Morrison SYLLOGISM
Any discussion of disciplinary proceedings against teachers must
begin with the leading case, Morrison v. State Board of Education.9
In that case, the petitioner, Morrison, was a secondary school
teacher holding a general secondary life credential. In 1963, he
became close friends with a fellow teacher, who was having marital
problems at the time. Morrison spent several hours counseling and
consoling the man, but on one such occasion they engaged in homo-
sexual contact of a non-criminal nature. One year after this inci-
dent, Morrison's friend informed the district's superintendent of
their previous conduct. Some nineteen months after the incident
became known to the superintendent, action was brought by the
State Board of Education. The Board, after a hearing, revoked
Morrison's credential on the grounds "that the incident constituted
immoral and unprofessional conduct, and an act involving moral
turpitude, all of which warrant revocation of life (credentials)
under Section 13202 of the (California) Education Code."'10 Morri-
son then sought a writ of mandate to set aside the decision and
reinstate his status as a teacher; that matter eventually reached
the Supreme Court of California.
In order to avoid holding Section 13202 of the California Educa-
tion Code unconstitutionally vague, the court gave it a narrow con-
struction.' It held that " . . . an individual can be removed from
the teaching profession only upon a showing that his retention in
the profession poses a significant danger of harm to either students,
9. Morrison, supra note 3.
10. Id., at 220, 461 P.2d at 378, 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 178, 179.
11. Id., at 232, 233, 461 P.2d at 389, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
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school employees, or others who might be affected by his actions
as a teacher." (Emphasis added.) 12 The Board of Education must
produce substantial evidence, establishing to a reasonable certainty,
that an adverse relationship exists between the conduct in ques-
tion and the teacher's fitness, the ability to meet professional
responsibilities. 13 In other words, the Board must establish a
"nexus between the conduct and teaching performance." (Empha-
sis added.) 14
The Morrison court set out a list of factors which should be con-
sidered in determining the effect of the questioned conduct upon
the individual's fitness as a teacher. Among these are -the status
of the parties involved in the conduct,15 the degree of notoriety
the conduct has gained,16 the proximity or remoteness of the con-
duct in relation to the disciplinary proceedings, 17 and the likelihood
of repetition.'8 The court also indicated that standing alone, the
fact that the conduct was criminal in nature or resulted in a con-
viction is insufficient grounds for revocation.19
THE MAJORITY's APPLICATION
The majority opinion in Pettit, per Justice Burke, distinquished
the facts before them from those in Morrison, and cases following,
on three points. First, the conduct involved in Pettit was criminal
in nature. Mrs. Pettit had been arrested and charged with the
violation of California Penal Code Section 288(a). A conviction on
this charge would have resulted in an automatic revocation of her
12. Id., at 235, 461 P.2d at 391, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
13. Morrison, supra note 3; accord, Board of Trustees v. Metzger, 8 Cal.
3d 206, 501 P.2d 1172, 104 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1972); see, Pettit, supra note 1,
at 37 and n.1, 513 P.2d at 894, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
14. Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 353 F. Supp. 254, 255 and n.1 (S.D.
Ore. 1973). This case held an Oregon statute similar to Section 13202 of
the California Education Code to be unconstitutionally vague.
15. Morrison, supra note 3; accord, Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield,
16 Cal. App. 3d 820, 94 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1971).
16. Morrison, supra note 3; accord, Comings v. State Board of Educa-
tion, 23 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100 Cal. Rptr. 73; Governing Board v. Brennan,
18 Cal. App. 3d 396, 95 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1971).
17. Morrison, supra note 3, at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
18. Morrison, supra note 3, at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186;
Comings, supra note 16 at 104, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
19. Morrison, supra note 3, at 219 and n.4, 461 P.2d at 377, 82 Cal. Rptr.
at 177; accord, Comings, supra note 16.
credential.20 Although the court conceded that the charges had
been dropped, they felt it relevant and proper to consider the origi-
nal charge.21
Secondly, the majority characterized the conduct as having oc-
curred in the "semi-public atmosphere of a club party.122  This
inference was then tied in with Mrs. Pettit's appearance on the
television talk show in 1966. Together, the court reasoned, -these
created enough notoriety surrounding her conduct so as to impair
her relationships with students, teachers and others.
Finally, Justice Burke stressed the testimony of the two super-
intendents and the assistant superintendent. Their testimony was
held to indicate a clear relationship between Mrs. Pettit's conduct
and her unfitness to teach. She would be unable to teach morals
and sexual values or to act as an exemplar for her students.23 All
told, the evidence was held to be clear, substantial and sufficient
in weight to establish the nexus required by Morrison.
THE MINORITY's ANALYSIS
The cogent dissent authored by Justice Tobriner analyzed the
three distinctions brought out and relied upon by the majority.
He indicated that the first distinction, that the conduct here was
criminal in nature while that in Morrison was not, has no probative
value standing alone. To begin with, the record did not show any
conviction under California Penal Code Section 288(a). Further-
more, the plea of guilty to the misdemeanor had been cleared from
the records and all proceedings dismissed. He pointed out that
in Morrison the court had pointed out that a conviction alone was
not grounds for revocation of a teacher's credential, noting the case
of Comings v. State Board of Education.24 This case had held that
evidence of a conviction for possession of marijuana alone, was in-
sufficient to sustain a revocation.
Justice Tobriner then sharply criticized the majority's handling
of the notoriety issue. In his opinion, plaintiff's conduct was pri-
vate in nature. By analogy to the definition of privacy developed
by the court in a series of cases, he stated that he was "at a loss
20. CAL. ED. CODE ANN. §§ 12912, 13206 and 13207 (West Supp. 1974),
amending CAL. ED. CODE ANN. §§ 12912, 13206 and 13207 (West 1969).
21. Pettit, supra note 1, at 33, 513 P.2d at 892, 893, 109 Cal. Rptr. at
667, 668.
22. Id., at 35, 513 P.2d at 893, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
23. Id., at 36 and n.7, 513 P.2d at 894, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
24. See, supra note 19.
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to understand" the majority's classification of plaintiff's conduct
as semi-public. 25
Finally, he analyzed the thrust of the expert testimony supplied
by the superintendents. The only conclusion that could be drawn
from the testimony was that the plaintiff would not be fit to teach
sexual morals to her pupils. 26 He then referred to Section 13556
of the Education Code and the regulations promulgated by the
State Board of Education implementing that section; he found that
nowhere are "sexual practices" included in the regulations deline-
ating those "principles of morality" which a teacher must seek to
instill in her pupils. 27 Thus, the logical inference to be drawn from
the expert testimony was that the plaintiff would be unfit to teach
sexual morality, but teaching sexual morality was not among her
duties as a teacher. Therefore, how could the majority have held
that the plaintiff was unfit to teach? The dissent concluded by
chastising the majority for clouding the standards enunciated by
Morrison: "[T] he majority is blind to the reality of sexual behav-
ior., 28
The other dissent was written by Justice Mosk. He concurred
in Justice Tobriner's dissent, then continued in a short but interest-
ing analysis. At the outset, he noted that both the National Edu-
cation Association and the California Teacher's Association had
filed amici curiae briefs in support of plaintiff's position. He, then,
indicated that the court should be bound by two factual findings
of the State Board of Education's hearing officer: first, that plain-
tiff's evaluation as a teacher had been satisfactory, and that she
had been tendered a contract for re-hire for the 1968-69 school
year; secondly, that she was unlikely to repeat the offensive con-
duct. Justice Mosk concluded that these factual findings left the
majority's opinion devoid of factual support.
25. Pettit, supra note 1, at 40, 513 P.2d at 897, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 673;
see, People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973);
In re Steinke, 2 Cal. App. 3d 569, 82 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1969); see also CAL.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 647 (West 1970).
26. First expert, "Plaintiff would be unable to teach 'moral and spiri-
tual principles' "; second expert, ". . . could not instruct (her) students
in 'clean morals' "; third expert, "plaintiff had a dishonest marriage";
Pettit, supra note 1, at 41, 42, 513 P.2d at 898, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
27. Petit, supra note 1, at 42 and n.6, 513 P.2d at 898, 109 Cal. Rptr.
at 674.
28. Id., at 44, 513 P.2d at 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
A TmIRD APPROACH
The essence of both dissenting opinions is that the Board failed
to establish the required nexus between plaintiff's conduct and her
fitness as a teacher. As discussed previously, 9 Morrison and the
cases which follow it have established a method of analysis through
which the nexus issue can be resolved.3 0  The principal fault of
the majority opinion in Pettit is that it fails to deal with the perti-
nent factors.
The first factor that should be considered is the status of the
parties involved in the conduct which gave rise to the disciplinary
proceedings. 31 For example, in Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield,3 2
a junior college teacher was dismissed upon evidence that he and
a student of his were found undressed in the front seat of his car
parked in a public lot. The status of the parties in Stubblefield
is a clear case for the proposition that his "retention in the profes-
sion poses a significant danger of harm.13 3 In Morrison the homo-
sexual conduct involved two teachers, yet the revocation was not
upheld. Note the difference between these cases and Pettit, where
the conduct involved a teacher and third parties or strangers to
the educational system. Her conduct did not directly involve any
professional relationships, and the status factor should have been
resolved in the plaintiff's favor.
The second factor is the degree of notoriety the conduct has
'gained in the community.3 4 In the case of Comings v. State Board
of Education35 and its companion case, Jones,36 the Court of Ap-
peal stressed the factor of publicity or notoriety. Both cases in-
volved teachers who had been arrested, charged, and convicted for
possessing marijuana. The Board had brought revocation proceed-
ings against each and had held each to be unfit. The Court of
Appeal reversed the action taken against Comings but affirmed
the holding against Jones. The only factual distinction between
the two was that Jones' arrest received a significant degree of pub-
licity in a local paper. The degree of notoriety plus the criminal
nature of the conduct was held to be sufficient grounds for revoca-
29. See, supra p. 4.
30. See, supra pp. 4 and 5.
31. Morrison, supra note 3; accord, Stubblefield, supra note 15.
32. Stubblefield, supra note 15; defendant had also been charged and
convicted of assaulting the police officer who had discovered him.
33. Morrison, supra note 3 at 235, 461 P.2d at 391, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
34. Morrison, supra note 3; accord, Comings, supra note 16 at 104, 100
Cal. Rptr. at 80.
35. 23 Cal. App. 3d 94, 104 Cal. Rptr. 73, 80 (1972).
36. Id., at 94, 100 Cal. Rptr. 73.
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tionY7  In Pettit the court makes reference to plaintiff's appear-
ance on the television show, using this to satisfy the element of
notoriety. The weakness here is that this appearance was more
than one year prior to the incident at the swingers' party. Surely,
where the court has referred to notoriety, it is referring to the
publicity surrounding the conduct at issue, not some other occur-
rence in the past. There was no evidence to indicate that plain-
tiff's actions at the party had gained any notoriety among her peers
,or students.
Having noted this weakness, the majority characterized Mrs. Pet-
tit's conduct in the private home as having occurred in the "semi-
public atmosphere of a club party." As pointed out in the dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Tobriner, the majority failed to analyze the
facts. It never dealt squarely with the issue of whether or not
conduct in a private home is public in nature.38  Thus the major-
ity's tortured analysis of the notoriety factor was clearly errone-
ous.
39
The third factor to consider is the proximity or remoteness of
the conduct in relation to the disciplinary proceedings.40  A lapse
of one and one half months between the conduct and the discipli-
nary proceeding is clearly not remote.41 However, a lapse of four-
teen months may be too remote. 42 In Morrison the majority felt
that the lapse of nineteen months from the time the superintendent
gained knowledge of the conduct to the instigation of the proceed-
ings had rendered the proceedings too remote.4 3 Yet in Pettit, a
full two years and three months had elapsed before the disciplinary
proceedings were brought. The majority fails to even recognize
37. See, Governing Board v. Brennan, 18 Cal. App. 3d 396, 95 Cal. Rptr.
712 (1971); Board of Education v. Calderon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 490, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 916 (1973). But see, Burton v. Cascade School Dist., supra note 14
(the fact that the teacher was a practicing, acknowledged homosexual was
insufficient to support a dismissal, absent other evidence of unfitness);
Board of Trustees v. Metzger, 8 Cal. 3d 206, 501 P.2d 1172, 104 Cal. Rptr.
452 (1972).
38. See, supra note 25.
39. Compare Pettit with Governing Board v. Brennan, supra note 37 and
Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra note 15 and also p. 4.
40. Morrison, supra note 3, at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
41. Stubblefield, supra note 15.
42. Comings, supra note 16.
43. Morrison, supra note 3.
this factor. Must our past indiscretions follow us for years? It
seems unjust to allow the Board to bring action upon stale facts
and incidents which are, or should have been, forgotten.
The last factor to be considered is the likelihood that the plaintiff
will repeat the conduct.44 Plaintiff's expert testified that she was
not likely to repeat the prior offenses. This conclusion was ac-
cepted by the hearing examiner. 45  Yet the majority put little
weight on this factor in contrast to the analysis stated in Morri-
son. The Court of Appeal in Comings, cited Morrison as having
held that such evidence is both relevant and probative.46 It would
appear reasonable to stress this factor since the rationale behind
the revocation procedure is the protection of students, teachers and
others involved in the educational system. If the plaintiff has
done no harm, nor threatened such, against this protected class,
the fact that she poses no potential for harm in the future is sig-
nificant. Isn't this the real issue in any consideration of one's fit-
ness as a teacher?
The fact that the criminality or non-criminality of plaintiff's
conduct was not dispositive of the fitness issue was conceded by
the court. Was it proper for the majority to have dwelt on the
issue to such an extent? The facts reveal that there was no crim-
inal record, that ultimately all charges had been dismissed. The
only charge specified in the original guilty plea was for violation
of Section 650.5 of the California Penal Code. This code section
had been declared unconstitutional in 1966.47 The court duly notes
that any violation of Section 288(a) (oral copulation) requires an
automatic revocation, pursuant to Sections 13206, 13207 and 12912
of the California Education Code.48 Yet it seems highly improper
for the court to make any distinction between Morrison and Pettit
based upon the criminality or non-criminality of the conduct in-
volved, where the record is clear that there was no criminal con-
viction for the conduct in question. Furthermore, the court has
held that, "[i]n determining whether discipline is authorized and
reasonable, a criminal conviction has no talismanic significance. '49
In the final analysis, it is clear that the facts in the Pettit case
do not support the court's opinion. To establish a teacher's unfit-
44. Morrison, supra note 3, at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186;
accord, Comings, supra note 16, at 104, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
45. Petit, supra note 1 at 32, 513 P.2d at 891, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
46. Comings, supra note 16.
47. See, supra note 6.
48. CAL. ED. CODE ANN. §§ 12912, 13206 and 13207 (West Supp. 1974),
amending §§ 12912, 13206 and 13207 (West Supp. 1969).
49. Morrison, supra note 3 at 219, 461 P.2d at 377, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
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ness to teach, the evidence must establish a nexus between the
conduct complained of and the significant danger of harm such
conduct poses to the teacher's professional relationships. Previous
case law has held this to be required by considerations of due proc-
ess. The status of the parties involved in the conduct supplies
no basis for revocation whatsoever in Pettit. The plaintiff's actions
had not gained the notoriety deemed sufficient to impair her pro-
fessonal relationships. Cases cited by the majority in support of
their position are clearly distinguishable.50 Rather than being sup-
portive of its position, the cases are factually contrary to the ma-
j ority's analysis and characterization of the facts in Pettit.
The action brought by the Board of Education was too remote.
The lapse of time was longer than any case cited by the majority.
The majority failed to even consider this factor of fairness. Fur-
thermore, the hearing commissioner's findings of fact expressly
stated that there was little likelihood of recurrence. The expert
testimony against plaintiff was far from clear. Even if accepted
at face value, it concluded only that Mrs. Pettit was unfit to teach
that which she had no duty to teach. The criminal nature versus
the non-criminal nature issue was rendered moot by the expunging
of the record.
Thus, on all factors, the evidence adduced had failed to estab-
lish that nexus required by law. The court, in Morrison, may have
foreshadowed the future when it stated that "[s]urely incidents
of extramarital heterosexual conduct against a background of years
of satisfactory teaching would not constitute 'immoral conduct' suf-
ficiently to justify revocation of a life diploma without any show-
ing of an adverse effect on fitness to teach."'' The court's opinion
in Pettit indicates that such incidents do constitute sufficient evi-
dence to revoke a teaching credential. The opinion is not in line
with those cases that preceded it and ignores the factual distinc-
tions that are presented therein.
JoHN H. PAULSEN
50. See, e.g., Comings, supra note 16; Stubblefield, supra note 15; Gov-
erning Board v. Brennan, supra note 16.
51. Morrison, supra note 3, at 225, 226, 461 P.2d at 383, 82 Cal. Rptr.
at 183.
